Chapter Overview
Zenon Pylyshyn is one of the leading figures in the study of the foundations of cognitive science. His own training was highly interdisciplinary; he earned degrees in engineering-physics, control systems, and experimental psychology. In 1994, he joined Rutgers University as Board of Governors Professor of Cognitive Science and Director of the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science. Prior to his arrival at Rutgers he was Professor of Psychology, Professor of Computer Science, Director of the University of Western Ontario Center for Cognitive Science, and an honorary professor in the departments of Philosophy and Electrical Engineering at Western. I myself had the privilege of having Pylyshyn as my PhD supervisor when I was a graduate student at Western.
Pylyshyn is one of the key proponents of classical cognitive science (Dedrick & Trick, 2009) . One of the most important contributions to classical cognitive science has been his analysis of its foundations, presented in his classic work Computation and Cognition (Pylyshyn, 1984) . Pylyshyn's (1984) book serves as a manifesto for classical cognitive science, in which cognition is computation: the manipulation of formal symbols. It stands as one of the pioneering appeals for using the multiple levels of investigation within cognitive science. It provides an extremely cogent argument for the need to use a cognitive vocabulary to capture explanatory generalizations in the study of cognition. In it, Pylyshyn also argued for establishing the 8 strong equivalence of a cognitive theory by determining the characteristics of the cognitive architecture.
As a champion of classical cognitive science, it should not be surprising that Pylyshyn has published key criticisms of other approaches to cognitive science. Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) Cognition article "Connectionism and cognitive architecture" is one of the most cited critiques of connectionist cognitive science that has ever appeared. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) have also provided one of the major critiques of direct perception (Gibson, 1979) . This places Pylyshyn securely in the camp against embodied cognitive science; direct perception in its modern form of active perception (Noë, 2004) has played a major role in defining the embodied approach. Given the strong anti-classical, anti-representational perspective of radical embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009) , it is far from surprising to be able to cite Pylyshyn's work in opposition to it.
In addition to pioneering classical cognitive science, Pylyshyn has been a crucial contributor to the literature on mental imagery and visual cognition. He is well known as a proponent of the propositional account of mental imagery, and he has published key articles critiquing its opponent, the depictive view (Pylyshyn, 1973 (Pylyshyn, , 1979b (Pylyshyn, , 1981a (Pylyshyn, , 2003b . His 1973 article "What the mind's eye tells the mind's brain:
A critique of mental imagery" is a science citation classic that is responsible for launching the imagery debate in cognitive science. In concert with his analysis of mental imagery, Pylyshyn has developed a theory of visual cognition that may serve as an account of how cognition connects to the world (Pylyshyn, 1989 (Pylyshyn, , 1999 (Pylyshyn, , 2000 (Pylyshyn, , 2001 (Pylyshyn, , 2003c (Pylyshyn, , 2007 Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) . The most extensive treatments of this theory can be found in his 2003 book Seeing and Visualizing-which inspired the title of the current chapter-and in his 2007 book Things and Places.
The purpose of the current chapter is to provide a brief introduction to Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition, in part because this theory provides a wonderful example of the interdisciplinary scope of modern cognitive science. A second, more crucial reason is that, as argued in this chapter, this theory contains fundamental aspects of all three approaches-in spite of Pylyshyn's position as a proponent of classical cognitive science and as a critic of both connectionist and embodied cognitive science. Thus Pylyshyn's account of visual cognition provides an example of the type of hybrid theory that was alluded to in the previous two chapters: a theory that requires classical, connectionist, and embodied elements.
The Transparency of Visual Processing
Some researchers are concerned that many perceptual theorists tacitly assume a snapshot conception of experience (Noë, 2002) or a video camera theory of vision (Frisby, 1980) . Such tacit assumptions are rooted in our phenomenal experience of an enormously high-quality visual world that seems to be delivered to us effortlessly. "You open your eyes and-presto!-you enjoy a richly detailed picture-like experience of the world, one that represents the world in sharp focus, uniform detail and high resolution from the centre out to the periphery" (Noë, 2002, p. 2) .
Indeed, our visual experience suggests that perception puts us in direct contact with reality. Perception is transparent; when we attempt to attend to perceptual processing, we miss the processing itself and instead experience the world around us (Gendler & Hawthorne, 2006) . Rather than experiencing the world as picture-like (Noë, 2002) , it is as if we simply experience the world (Chalmers, 2006; MerleauPonty, 1962) . Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 77) noted that "our perception ends in objects, and the object [,] once constituted, appears as the reason for all the experiences of it which we have had or could have." Chalmers (2006) asserts that, in the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory. (Chalmers, 2006, p. 49) To say that visual processing is transparent is to say that we are only aware of the contents that visual processes deliver. This was a central assumption to the so-called New Look theory of perception. For instance, Bruner (1957, p. 124) presumed that "all perceptual experience is necessarily the end product of a categorization process." Ecological perception (Gibson, 1979) , a theory that stands in strong opposition in almost every respect to the New Look, also agrees that perceptual processes are transparent. "What one becomes aware of by holding still, closing one eye, and observing a frozen scene are not visual sensations but only the surfaces of the world that are viewed now from here" (p. 286, italics original).
That visual processing is transparent is not a position endorsed by all. For instance, eighteenth-century philosopher George Berkeley and nineteenth-century art critic John Ruskin both argued that it was possible to recover the "innocence of the eye" (Gombrich, 1960) . According to this view, it is assumed that at birth humans have no concepts, and therefore cannot experience the world in terms of objects or categories; "what we really see is only a medley of colored patches such as Turner paints" (p. 296). Seeing the world of objects requires learning about the required categories. It was assumed that an artist could return to the "innocent eye": "the painter must clear his mind of all he knows about the object he sees, wipe the slate clean, and make nature write her own story" (p. 297).
Most modern theories of visual perception take the middle ground between the New Look and the innocent eye by proposing that our experience of visual categories is supported by, or composed of, sensed information (Mach, 1959) . Mach (1959) proclaimed that, thus, perceptions, presentations, volitions, and emotions, in short the whole inner and outer world, are put together, in combinations of varying evanescence and permanence, out of a small number of homogeneous elements. Usually, these elements are called sensations. (Mach, 1959, p. 22) From this perspective, a key issue facing any theory of seeing or visualizing is determining where sensation ends and where perception begins.
Unfortunately, the demarcation between sensation and perception is not easily determined by introspection. Subjective experience can easily lead us to the intentional fallacy in which a property of the content of a mental representation is mistakenly attributed to the representation itself (Pylyshyn, 2003c) . We see in the next section that the transparency of visual processing hides from our awareness a controversial set of processes that must cope with tremendously complex information processing problems.
The Poverty of the Stimulus
Some researchers have noted a striking tension between experience and science (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) . On the one hand, our everyday experience provides a compelling and anchoring sense of self-consciousness. On the other hand, cognitive science assumes a fundamental self-fragmentation, because much of thought is putatively mediated by mechanisms that are modular, independent, and completely incapable of becoming part of conscious experience. "Thus cognitivism challenges our conviction that consciousness and the mind either amount to the same thing or [that] there is an essential or necessary connection between them" (p. 49).
The tension between experience and science is abundantly evident in vision research. It is certainly true that the scientific study of visual perception relies heavily on the analysis of visual experience (Pylyshyn, 2003c) . However, researchers are convinced that this analysis must be performed with caution and be supplemented by additional methodologies. This is because visual experience is not complete, in the sense that it does not provide direct access to or experience of visual processing. Pylyshyn (2003b) wrote, what we do [experience] is misleading because it is always the world as it appears to us that we see, not the real work that is being done by the mind in going from the proximal stimuli, generally optical patterns on the retina, to the familiar experience of seeing (or imagining) the world. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. xii) Vision researchers have long been aware that the machinery of vision is not a part of our visual experience. Helmholtz noted that "it might seem that nothing could be easier than to be conscious of one's own sensations; and yet experience shows that for the discovery of subjective sensations some special talent is needed" (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962b, p. 6) . Cognitive psychologist Roger Shepard observed that, we do not first experience a two-dimensional image and then consciously calculate or infer the three-dimensional scene that is most likely, given that image. The first thing we experience is the three-dimensional world-as our visual system has already inferred it for us on the basis of the two-dimensional input. (Shepard, 1990, p. 168) In the nineteenth century, Hermann von Helmholtz argued that our visual experience results from the work of unconscious mechanisms. "The psychic activities that lead us to infer that there in front of us at a certain place there is a certain object of a certain character, are generally not conscious activities, but unconscious ones" (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962b, p. 4) . However, the extent and nature of this unconscious processing was only revealed when researchers attempted to program computers to see. It was then discovered that visual processes face a difficult problem that also spurred advances in modern linguistic theory: the poverty of the stimulus.
Generative linguistics distinguished between those theories of language that were descriptively adequate and those that were explanatorily adequate (Chomsky, 1965) . A descriptively adequate theory of language provided a grammar that was capable of describing the structure of any possible grammatical sentence in a language and incapable of describing the structure of any sentence that did not belong to this language. A more powerful explanatorily adequate theory was descriptively adequate but also provided an account of how that grammar was learned. "To the extent that a linguistic theory succeeds in selecting a descriptively adequate grammar on the basis of primary linguistic data, we can say that it meets the condition of explanatory adequacy" (p. 25).
Why did Chomsky use the ability to account for language learning as a defining characteristic of explanatory adequacy? It was because Chomsky realized that language learning faced the poverty of the stimulus. The poverty-of-the-stimulus argument is the claim that primary linguistic data-that is, the linguistic utterances heard by a child-do not contain enough information to uniquely specify the grammar used to produce them.
It seems that a child must have the ability to 'invent' a generative grammar that defines well-formedness and assigns interpretations to sentences even though the primary linguistic data that he uses as a basis for this act of theory construction may, from the point of view of the theory he constructs, be deficient in various respects. (Chomsky, 1965, p. 201) The poverty of the stimulus is responsible for formal proofs that text learning of a language is not possible if the language is defined by a complex grammar (Gold, 1967; Pinker, 1979; Wexler & Culicover, 1980) . Language acquisition can be described as solving the projection problem: determining the mapping from primary linguistic data to the acquired grammar (Baker, 1979; Peters, 1972) . When language learning is so construed, the poverty of the stimulus becomes a problem of underdetermination. That is, the projection from data to grammar is not unique, but is instead one-to-many: one set of primary linguistic data is consistent with many potential grammars.
For sighted individuals, our visual experience makes us take visual perception for granted. We have the sense that we simply look at the world and see it. Indeed, the phenomenology of vision led artificial intelligence pioneers to expect that building vision into computers would be a straightforward problem. For instance, Marvin Minsky assigned one student, as a summer project, the task of programming a computer to see (Horgan, 1993) . However, failures to develop computer vision made it apparent that the human visual system was effortlessly solving, in real time, enormously complicated information processing problems. Like language learning, vision is dramatically underdetermined. That is, if one views vision as the projection from primary visual data (the proximal stimulus on the retina) to the internal interpretation or representation of the distal scene, this projection is one-to-many. A single proximal stimulus is consistent with an infinite number of different interpretations (Gregory, 1970; Marr, 1982; Pylyshyn, 2003c; Rock, 1983; Shepard, 1990) .
One reason that vision is underdetermined is because the distal world is arranged in three dimensions of space, but the primary source of visual information we have about it comes from patterns of light projected onto an essentially two dimensional surface, the retina. "According to a fundamental theorem of topology, the relations between objects in a space of three dimensions cannot all be preserved in a two-dimensional projection" (Shepard, 1990, pp. 173-175) .
This source of underdetermination is illustrated in Figure 8 -1, which illustrates a view from the top of an eye observing a point in the distal world as it moves from position X 1 to position Y 1 over a given interval of time. The primary visual data caused by this movement is the motion, from point A to point B, of a point projected onto the back of the retina. The projection from the world to the back of the eye is uniquely defined by the laws of optics and of projective geometry. However, the projection in the other direction, from the retina to the distal world, is not unique. If one attempts to use the retinal information alone to identify the distal conditions that caused it, then infinitely many possibilities are available. Any of the different paths of motion in the world (occurring over the same duration) that are illustrated in Figure 8 -1 are consistent with the proximal information projected onto the eye. Indeed, movement from any position along the dashed line through the X-labelled points to any position along the other dashed line is a potential cause of the proximal stimulus.
One reason for the poverty of the visual stimulus, as illustrated in Figure 8 -1, is that information is necessarily lost when an image from a three-dimensional space is projected onto a two-dimensional surface.
We are so familiar with seeing, that it takes a leap of imagination to realize that there are problems to be solved. But consider it. We are given tiny distorted upsidedown images in the eyes, and we see separate solid objects in surrounding space.
From the patterns of stimulation on the retinas we perceive the world of objects, and this is nothing short of a miracle. (Gregory, 1978, p. 9) A second reason for the poverty of the visual stimulus arises because the neural circuitry that mediates visual perception is subject to the limited order constraint (Minsky & Papert, 1969) . There is no single receptor that takes in the entire visual stimulus in a glance. Instead, each receptor processes only a small part of the primary visual data. This produces deficiencies in visual information. For example, consider the aperture problem that arises in motion perception (Hildreth, 1983) , illustrated in Figure 8 -2. In this situation, a motion detector's task is to detect the movement of a contour, shown in grey. However, the motion detector is of limited order: its window on the moving contour is the circular aperture in the figure, an aperture that is much smaller than the contour it observes.
Because of its small aperture, the motion detector in Figure 8 -2 can only be sensitive to the component of the contour's motion that is perpendicular to the edge of the contour, vector A. It is completely blind to any motion parallel to the contour, the dashed vector B. This is because movement in this direction will not change the appearance of anything within the aperture. As a result, the motion detector is unable to detect the true movement of the contour, vector T.
The limited order constraint leads to a further source of visual underdetermination. If visual detectors are of limited order, then our interpretation of the proximal stimulus must be the result of combining many different (and deficient) local measurements together. However, many different global interpretations exist that are consistent with a single set of such measurements. The local measurements by themselves cannot uniquely determine the global perception that we experience.
Consider the aperture problem of Figure 8 -2 again. Imagine one, or many, local motion detectors that deliver vector A at many points along that contour. How many true motions of the contour could produce this situation? In principle, one can create an infinite number of different possible vector Ts by choosing any desired length of vector B-to which any of the detectors are completely blind-and adding it to the motion that is actually detected, i.e., vector A. Pylyshyn (2003b Pylyshyn ( , 2007 provided many arguments against the theory that vision constructs a representation of the world, which is depictive in nature. However, the theory that Pylyshyn opposed is deeply entrenched in accounts of visual processing.
For years the common view has been that a large-scope inner image is built up by superimposing information from individual glances at the appropriate coordinates of the master image: as the eye moves over a scene, the information on the retina is transmitted to the perceptual system, which then projects it onto an inner screen in the appropriate location, thus painting the larger scene for the mind side to observe. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, pp. 16-17) Proponents of this view face another source of the poverty of the visual stimulus. It is analogous to the limited order constraint, in the sense that it arises because vision proceeds by accessing small amounts of information in a sequence of fragmentary glimpses.
Although we experience our visual world as a rich, stable panorama that is present in its entirety, this experience is illusory (Dennett, 1991; Pylyshyn, 2003c Pylyshyn, , 2007 . Evidence suggests that we only experience fragments of the distal world a glance at a time. For instance, we are prone to change blindness, where we fail to notice a substantial visual change even though it occurs in plain sight (O'Regan et al., 2000) .
A related phenomenon is inattentional blindness, in which visual information that should be obvious is not noticed because attention is not directed to it (even though the gaze is!). In one famous experiment (Simons & Chabris, 1999) , subjects watched a video of a basketball game and were instructed to count the number of times that the teams changed possession of the ball. In the midst of the game a person dressed in a gorilla suit walked out onto the court and danced a jig. Amazingly, most subjects failed to notice this highly visible event because they were paying attention to the ball.
If the visual system collects fragments of visual information a glance at a time, then our visual experience further suggests that these different fragments are "stitched together" to create a stable panorama. In order for this to occur, the fragments have to be inserted in the correct place, presumably by identifying components of the fragment (in terms of visible properties) in such a way that it can be asserted that "object x in one location in a glimpse collected at time t + 1 is the same thing as object y in a different location in a glimpse collected at an earlier time t." This involves computing correspondence, or tracking the identities of objects over time or space, a problem central to the study of binocular vision (Marr, Palm, & Poggio, 1978; Marr & Poggio, 1979) and motion perception (Dawson, 1991; Dawson & Pylyshyn, 1988; Ullman, 1978 Ullman, , 1979 .
However, the computing of correspondence is a classic problem of underdetermination. If there are N different elements in two different views of a scene, then there are at least N! ways to match the identities of elements across the views. This problem cannot be solved by image matching-basing the matches on the appearance or description of elements in the different views-because the dynamic nature of the world, coupled with the loss of information about it when it is projected onto the eyes, means that there are usually radical changes to an object's proximal stimulus over even brief periods of time.
How do we know which description uniquely applies to a particular individual and, what's more important, how do we know which description will be unique at some time in the future when we will need to find the representation of that particular token again in order to add some newly noticed information to it? (Pylyshyn, 2007, p. 12) To summarize, visual perception is intrinsically underdetermined because of the poverty of the visual stimulus. If the goal of vision is to construct representations of the distal world, then proximal stimuli do not themselves contain enough information to accomplish this goal. In principle, an infinite number of distal scenes could be the cause of a single proximal stimulus. "And yet we do not perceive a range of possible alternative worlds when we look out at a scene. We invariably see a single unique layout. Somehow the visual system manages to select one of the myriad logical possibilities" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 94) . Furthermore, the interpretation selected by the visual system seems-from our success in interacting with the world-to almost always be correct. "What is remarkable is that we err so seldom" (Shepard, 1990, p. 175) .
How does the visual system compensate for the poverty of the stimulus as well as generate unique and accurate solutions to problems of underdetermination? In the following sections we consider two very different answers to this question, both of which are central to Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition. The first of these, which can be traced back to Helmholtz (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962b) and which became entrenched with the popularity of the New Look in the 1950s (Bruner, 1957 (Bruner, , 1992 , is that visual perception is full-fledged cognitive processing. "Given the slenderest clues to the nature of surrounding objects we identify them and act not so much according to what is directly sensed, but to what is believed" (Gregory, 1970, p. 11).
Enrichment via Unconscious Inference
Hermann von Helmholtz was not aware of problems of visual underdetermination of the form illustrated in Figures 8-1 and 8-2. However, he was aware that visual sensors could be seriously misled. One example that he considered at length (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962a , 1962b was the mechanical stimulation of the eye (e.g., slight pressure on the eyeball made by a blunt point), which produced a sensation of light (a pressure-image or phosphene) even though a light stimulus was not present. From this he proposed a general rule for determining the "ideas of vision":
Such objects are always imagined as being present in the field of vision as would have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous mechanism, the eyes being used under ordinary normal conditions. (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962b, p. 2) Helmholtz's studies of such phenomena forced him to explain the processes by which such a rule could be realized. He first noted that the visual system does not have direct access to the distal world, but instead that primary visual data was retinal activity. He concluded that inference must be involved to transform retinal activity into visual experience. "It is obvious that we can never emerge from the world of our sensations to the apperception of an external world, except by inferring from the changing sensation that external objects are the causes of this change" (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962b, p. 33) . This theory allowed Helmholtz to explain visual illusions as the result of mistaken reasoning rather than as the product of malfunctions in the visual apparatus: "It is rather simply an illusion in the judgment of the material presented to the senses, resulting in a false idea of it" (p. 4).
Helmholtz argued that the accuracy of visual inferences is due to an agent's constant exploration and experimentation with the world, determining how actions in the world such as changing viewpoints alter visual experience.
Spontaneously and by our own power, we vary some of the conditions under which the object has been perceived. We know that the changes thus produced in the way that objects look depend solely on the movements we have executed. Thus we obtain a different series of apperceptions of the same object, by which we can be convinced with experimental certainty that they are simply apperceptions and that it is the common cause of them all. (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962b, p. 31) Helmholtz argued that the only difference between visual inference and logical reasoning was that the former was unconscious while the latter was not, describing "the psychic acts of ordinary perception as unconscious conclusions" (Helmholtz & Southall, 1962b, p. 4) . Consciousness aside, seeing and reasoning were processes of the same kind: "There can be no doubt as to the similarity between the results of such unconscious conclusions and those of conscious conclusions" (p. 4).
A century after Helmholtz, researchers were well aware of the problem of underdetermination with respect to vision. Their view of this problem was that it was based in the fact that certain information is missing from the proximal stimulus, and that additional processing is required to supply the missing information. With the rise of cognitivism in the 1950s, researchers proposed a top-down, or theory-driven, account of perception in which general knowledge of the world was used to disambiguate the proximal stimulus (Bruner, 1957 (Bruner, , 1992 Bruner, Postman, & Rodrigues, 1951; Gregory, 1970 Gregory, , 1978 Rock, 1983) . This approach directly descended from Helmholtz's discussion of unconscious conclusions because it equated visual perception with cognition.
One of the principal characteristics of perceiving [categorization] is a characteristic of cognition generally. There is no reason to assume that the laws governing inferences of this kind are discontinuous as one moves from perceptual to more conceptual activities. (Bruner, 1957, p. 124) The cognitive account of perception that Jerome Bruner originated in the 1950s came to be known as the New Look. According to the New Look, higher-order cognitive processes could permit beliefs, expectations, and general knowledge of the world to provide additional information for disambiguation of the underdetermining proximal stimulus. "We not only believe what we see: to some extent we see what we believe" (Gregory, 1970, p. 15) . Hundreds of studies provided experimental evidence that perceptual experience was determined in large part by a perceiver's beliefs or expectations. (For one review of this literature see Pylyshyn, 2003b.) Given the central role of cognitivism since the inception of the New Look, it is not surprising that this type of theory has dominated the modern literature.
The belief that perception is thoroughly contaminated by such cognitive factors as expectations, judgments, beliefs, and so on, became the received wisdom in much of psychology, with virtually all contemporary elementary texts in human information processing and vision taking that point of view for granted. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 56) To illustrate the New Look, consider a situation in which I see a small, black and white, irregularly shaped, moving object. This visual information is not sufficient to uniquely specify what in the world I am observing. To deal with this problem, I use general reasoning processes to disambiguate the situation. Imagine that I am inside my home. I know that I own a black and white cat, I believe that the cat is indoors, and I expect that I will see this cat in the house. Thus I experience this visual stimulus as "seeing my cat Phoebe." In a different context, different expectations exist. For instance, if I am outside the house on the street, then the same proximal stimulus will be disambiguated with different expectations; "I see my neighbour's black and white dog Shadow." If I am down walking in the forest by the creek, then I may use different beliefs to "see a skunk."
It would seem that a higher agency of the mind, call it the executive agency, has available to it the proximal input, which it can scan, and it then behaves in a manner very like a thinking organism in selecting this or that aspect of the stimulus as representing the outer object or event in the world. (Rock, 1983, p. 39) The New Look in perception is a prototypical example of classical cognitive science. If visual perception is another type of cognitive processing, then it is governed by the same laws as are reasoning and problem solving. In short, a crucial consequence of the New Look is that visual perception is rational, in the sense that vision's success is measured in terms of the truth value of the representations it produces.
For instance, Richard Gregory (1970, p. 29, italics added) remarked that "it is surely remarkable that out of the infinity of possibilities the perceptual brain generally hits on just about the best one." Gregory (1978, p. 13, italics added) also equated visual perception to problem solving, describing it as "a dynamic searching for the best interpretation of the available data." The cognitive nature of perceptual processing allows, past experience and anticipation of the future to play a large part in augmenting sensory information, so that we do not perceive the world merely from the sensory information available at any given time, but rather we use this information to test hypotheses of what lies before us. Perception becomes a matter of suggesting and testing hypotheses. (Gregory, 1978, p. 221) In all of these examples, perception is described as a process that delivers representational contents that are most (semantically) consistent with visual sensations and other intentional contents, such as beliefs and desires.
The problem with the New Look is this rational view of perception. Because of its emphasis on top-down influences, the New Look lacks an account of links between the world and vision that are causal and independent of beliefs. If all of our perceptual experience was belief dependent, then we would never see anything that we did not expect to see. This would not contribute to our survival, which often depends upon noticing and reacting to surprising circumstances in the environment. Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 hybrid theory of visual cognition rests upon the assumption that there exists a cognitively impenetrable visual architecture that is separate from general cognition. This architecture is data-driven in nature, governed by causal influences from the visual world and insulated from beliefs and expectations. Such systems can solve problems of underdetermination without requiring assumptions of rationality, as discussed in the next section.
Natural Constraints
Some researchers would argue that perception is a form of cognition, because it uses inferential reasoning or problem solving processing to go beyond the information given. However, this kind of account is not the only viable approach for dealing with the poverty of the visual stimulus. Rock (1983, p. 3) wrote: "A phenomenon may appear to be intelligent, but the mechanism underlying it may have no common ground with the mechanisms underlying reasoning, logical thought, or problem solving." The natural computation approach to vision (Ballard, 1997; Marr, 1982; Richards, 1988) illustrates the wisdom of Rock's quote, because it attempts to solve problems of underdetermination by using bottom-up devices that apply built-in constraints to filter out incorrect interpretations of an ambiguous proximal stimulus.
The central idea underlying natural computation is constraint propagation. Imagine a set of locations to which labels can be assigned, where each label is a possible property that is present at a location. Underdetermination exists when more than one label is possible at various locations. However, constraints can be applied to remove these ambiguities. Imagine that if some label x is assigned to one location then this prevents some other label y from being assigned to a neighbouring location. Say that there is good evidence to assign label x to the first location. Once this is done, a constraint can propagate outwards from this location to its neighbours, removing label y as a possibility for them and therefore reducing ambiguity.
Constraint propagation is part of the science underlying the popular Sudoku puzzles (Delahaye, 2006) . A Sudoku puzzle is a 9 × 9 grid of cells, as illustrated in Figure 8 -3. The grid is further divided into a 3 × 3 array of smaller 3 × 3 grids called cages. In Figure 8 -3, the cages are outlined by the thicker lines. When the puzzle is solved, each cell will contain a digit from the range 1 to 9, subject to three constraints. First, a digit can occur only once in each row of 9 cells across the grid. Second, a digit can only occur once in each column of 9 cells along the grid. Third, a digit can only occur once in each cage in the grid. The puzzle begins with certain numbers already assigned to their cells, as illustrated in Figure 8 -3. The task is to fill in the remaining digits in such a way that none of the three constraining rules are violated. A Sudoku puzzle can be considered as a problem to be solved by relaxation labelling. In relaxation labelling, sets of possible labels are available at different locations. For instance, at the start of the puzzle given in Figure 8 -3 the possible labels at every blank cell are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. There is only one possible label (given in the figure) that has already been assigned to each of the remaining cells. The task of relaxation labelling is to iteratively eliminate extra labels at the ambiguous locations, so that at the end of processing only one label remains. In the context of relaxation labelling, Sudoku puzzles can be solved by propagating different constraints through the grid; this causes potential labels to be removed from ambiguous cells. One key constraint, called "there can be only one," emerges from the primary definition of a Sudoku puzzle. In the example problem given in Figure 8 -3, the digit 5 has been assigned at the start to a particular location, which is also shown in Figure 8 -4. According to the rules of Sudoku, this means that this digit cannot appear anywhere else in the column, row, or cage that contains this location. The affected locations are shaded dark grey in Figure 8 -4. One can propagate the "there can be only one" constraint through these locations, removing the digit 5 as a possible label for any of them. This constraint can be propagated iteratively through the puzzle. During one iteration, any cell with a unique label can be used to eliminate that label from all of the other cells that it controls (e.g., as in Figure 8-4) . When this constraint is applied in this way, the result may be that some new cells have unique labels. In this case the constraint can be applied again, from these newly unique cells, to further disambiguate the Sudoku puzzle.
The "there can be only one" constraint is important, but it is not powerful enough on its own to solve any but the easiest Sudoku problems. This means that other constraints must be employed as well. Another constraint is called "last available label," and is illustrated in Figure 8 -5.
Figure 8-5A illustrates one of the cages of the Figure 8 -3 Sudoku problem partway through being solved (i.e., after some iterations of "there can be only one"). The cells containing a single number have been uniquely labelled. The other cells still have more than one possible label, shown as multiple digits within the cell. Note the one cell at the bottom shaded in grey. It has the possible labels 1, 3, 5, and 9. However, this cell has the "last available label" of 9-the label 9 is not available in any other cell in the cage. Because a 9 is required to be in this cage, this means that this label must be assigned here and the cell's other three possible labels can be removed. Note that when this is done, the "last available label" constraint applies to a second cell (shown in grey in Figure 8 -5B), meaning that it can be uniquely assigned the label 1 by applying this constraint a second time. In the naked pair pointed out by the two arrows in Figure 8 -6, it is impossible for one cell to receive the label 3 and for the other cell not to receive the label 5. This is because these two cells have only two remaining possible labels, and both sets of labels are identical. However, this also implies that the labels 3 and 5 cannot exist elsewhere in the part of the puzzle over which the two cells containing the naked pair have control. Thus one can use this as a constraint to remove the possible labels 3 and 5 from the other cells in the same column as the naked pair, i.e., the cells shaded in grey in the lower part of Figure 8 -6. The three constraints described above have been implemented as a working model in an Excel spreadsheet. This model has confirmed that by applying only these three constraints one can solve a variety of Sudoku problems of easy and medium difficulty, and can make substantial progress on difficult problems. (These three constraints are not sufficient to solve the difficult Figure 8 -3 problem.) In order to develop a more successful Sudoku solver in this framework, one would have to identify additional constraints that can be used. A search of the Internet for "Sudoku tips" reveals a number of advanced strategies that can be described as constraints, and which could be added to a relaxation labelling model. For our purposes, though, the above Sudoku example illustrates how constraints can be propagated to solve problems of underdetermination. Furthermore, it shows that such solutions can be fairly mechanical in nature, not requiring higher-order reasoning or problem solving. For instance, the "there can be only one" constraint could be instantiated as a simple set of interconnected switches: turning the 5 on in Figure 8 -4 would send a signal that would turn the 5 off at all of the other greyshaded locations.
The natural computation approach to vision assumes that problems of visual underdetermination are also solved by non-cognitive processes that use constraint propagation. However, the constraints of interest to such researchers are not formal rules of a game. Instead, they adopt naïve realism, and they assume that the external world is structured and that some aspects of this structure must be true of nearly every visual scene. Because the visual system has evolved to function in this structured environment, it has internalized those properties that permit it to solve problems of underdetermination. "The perceptual system has internalized the most pervasive and enduring regularities of the world" (Shepard, 1990, p. 181) .
The regularities of interest to researchers who endorse natural computation are called natural constraints. A natural constraint is a property that is almost invariably true of any location in a visual scene. For instance, many visual properties of threedimensional scenes, such as depth, colour, texture, and motion, vary smoothly. This means that two locations in the three-dimensional scene that are very close together are likely to have very similar values for any of these properties, while this will not be the case for locations that are further apart. Smoothness can therefore be used to constrain interpretations of a proximal stimulus: an interpretation whose properties vary smoothly is much more likely to be true of the world than interpretations in which property smoothness is not maintained.
Natural constraints are used to solve visual problems of underdetermination by imposing additional restrictions on scene interpretations. In addition to being consistent with the proximal stimulus, the interpretation of visual input must also be consistent with the natural constraints. With appropriate natural constraints, only a single interpretation will meet both of these criteria (for many examples, see Marr, 1982) . A major research goal for those who endorse the natural computation approach to vision is identifying natural constraints that filter out correct interpretations from all the other (incorrect) possibilities.
For example, consider the motion correspondence problem (Ullman, 1979), which is central to Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 hybrid theory of visual cognition. In the motion correspondence problem, a set of elements is seen at one time, and another set of elements is seen at a later time. In order for the visual system to associate a sense of movement to these elements, their identities must be tracked over time. The assertion that some element x, seen at time t, is the "same thing" as some other element y, seen at time t + 1, is called a motion correspondence match. However, the assignment of motion correspondence matches is underdetermined. This is illustrated in Figure 8 -7 as a simple apparent motion stimulus in which two squares (dashed outlines) are presented at one time, and then later presented in different locations (solid outlines). For this display there are two logical sets of motion correspondence matches that can be assigned, shown in B and C of the figure. Both sets of matches are consistent with the display, but they represent radically different interpretations of the identities of the elements over time. Human observers of this display will invariably experience it as Figure 8 -7B, and never as Figure 8-7C . Why is this interpretation preferred over the other one, which seems just as logically plausible?
The natural computation approach answers this question by claiming that the interpretation illustrated in Figure 8 -7B is consistent with additional natural constraints, while the interpretation in Figure 8-7C is not. A number of different natural constraints on the motion correspondence problem have been identified and then incorporated into computer simulations of motion perception (Dawson, 1987 (Dawson, , 1991 Dawson, Nevin-Meadows, & Wright, 1994; Dawson & Pylyshyn, 1988; Dawson & Wright, 1989 , 1994 Ullman, 1979) . One such constraint is called the nearest neighbour principle. The visual system prefers to assign correspondence matches that represent short element displacements (Burt & Sperling, 1981; Ullman, 1979) . For example, the two motion correspondence matches in Figure 8 -7B are shorter than the two in Figure 8-7C; they are therefore more consistent with the nearest neighbour principle.
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The nearest neighbour principle is a natural constraint because it arises from the geometry of the typical viewing conditions for motion (Ullman, 1979, pp. 114-118) . When movement in a three-dimensional world is projected onto a two-dimensional surface (e.g., the retina), slower movements occur with much higher probability on the retina than do faster movements. A preference for slower movement is equivalent to exploiting the nearest neighbour principle, because a short correspondence match represents slow motion, while a long correspondence match represents fast motion.
Another powerful constraint on the motion correspondence problem is called the relative velocity principle (Dawson, 1987 (Dawson, , 1991 . To the extent that visual elements arise from physical features on solid surfaces, the movement of neighbouring elements should be similar. According to the relative velocity principle, motion correspondence matches should be assigned in such a way that objects located near one another will be assigned correspondence matches consistent with movements of similar direction and speed. This is true of the two matches illustrated in Figure  8 -7B, which are of identical length and direction, but not of the two matches illustrated in Figure 8 -7C, which are of identical length but represent motion in different directions.
Like the nearest neighbour constraint, the relative velocity principle is a natural constraint. It is a variant of the property that motion varies smoothly across a scene (Hildreth, 1983; Horn & Schunk, 1981) . That is, as objects in the real world move, locations near to one another should move in similar ways. Furthermore, Hildreth (1983) has proven that solid objects moving arbitrarily in three-dimensional space project unique smooth patterns of retinal movement. The relative velocity principle exploits this general property of projected motion.
Other natural constraints on motion correspondence have also been proposed. The element integrity principle is a constraint in which motion correspondence matches are assigned in such a way that elements only rarely split into two or fuse together into one (Ullman, 1979) . It is a natural constraint in the sense that the physical coherence of surfaces implies that the splits or fusions are unlikely. The polarity matching principle is a constraint in which motion correspondence matches are assigned between elements of identical contrast (e.g., between two elements that are both light against a dark background, or between two elements that are both dark against a light background) (Dawson, Nevin-Meadows, & Wright, 1994) . It is a natural constraint because movement of an object in the world might change its shape and colour, but is unlikely to alter the object's contrast relative to its background.
The natural computation approach to vision is an alternative to a classical approach called unconscious inference, because natural constraints can be exploited by systems that are not cognitive, that do not perform inferences on the basis of cognitive contents. In particular, it is very common to see natural computation models expressed in a very anti-classical form, namely, artificial neural networks (Marr, 1982) . Indeed, artificial neural networks provide an ideal medium for propagating constraints to solve problems of underdetermination.
The motion correspondence problem provides one example of an artificial neural network approach to solving problems of underdetermination (Dawson, 1991; Dawson, Nevin-Meadows, & Wright, 1994) . Dawson (1991) created an artificial neural network that incorporated the nearest neighbour, relative velocity, element integrity, and polarity matching principles. These principles were realized as patterns of excitatory and inhibitory connections between processors, with each processor representing a possible motion correspondence match. For instance, the connection between two matches that represented movements similar in distance and direction would have an excitatory component that reflected the relative velocity principle. Two matches that represented movements of different distances and directions would have an inhibitory component that reflected the same principle. The network would start with all processors turned on to similar values (indicating that each match was initially equally likely), and then the network would iteratively send signals amongst the processors. The network would quickly converge to a state in which some processors remained on (representing the preferred correspondence matches) while all of the others were turned off. This model was shown to be capable of modelling a wide variety of phenomena in the extensive literature on the perception of apparent movement.
The natural computation approach is defined by another characteristic that distinguishes it from classical cognitive science. Natural constraints are not psychological properties, but are instead properties of the world, or properties of how the world projects itself onto the eyes. "The visual constraints that have been discovered so far are based almost entirely on principles that derive from laws of optics and projective geometry" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 120) . Agents exploit natural constraints-or more precisely, they internalize these constraints in special processors that constitute what Pylyshyn calls early vision-because they are generally true of the world and therefore work.
To classical theories that appeal to unconscious inference, natural constraints are merely "heuristic bags of tricks" that happen to work (Anstis, 1980; Ramachandran & Anstis, 1986) ; there is no attempt to ground these tricks in the structure of the world. In contrast, natural computation theories are embodied, because they appeal to structure in the external world and to how that structure impinges on perceptual agents. As naturalist Harold Horwood (1987, p. 35) writes, "If you look attentively at a fish you can see that the water has shaped it. The fish is not merely in the water: the qualities of the water itself have called the fish into being."
Vision, Cognition, and Visual Cognition
It was argued earlier that the classical approach to underdetermination, unconscious inference, suffered from the fact that it did not include any causal links between the world and internal representations. The natural computation approach does not suffer from this problem, because its theories treat vision as a data-driven or bottom-up process. That is, visual information from the world comes into contact with visual modules-special purpose machines-that automatically apply natural constraints and deliver uniquely determined representations. How complex are the representations that can be delivered by data-driven processing? To what extent could a pure bottom-up theory of perception succeed?
On the one hand, the bottom-up theories are capable of delivering a variety of rich representations of the visual world (Marr, 1982) . These include the primal sketch, which represents the proximal stimulus as an array of visual primitives, such as oriented bars, edges, and terminators (Marr, 1976) . Another is the 2½-D sketch, which makes explicit the properties of visible surfaces in viewercentred coordinates, including their depth, colour, texture, and orientation (Marr & Nishihara, 1978) . The information made explicit in the 2½-D sketch is available because data-driven processes can solve a number of problems of underdetermination, often called "shape from" problems, by using natural constraints to determine three-dimensional shapes and distances of visible elements. These include structure from motion (Hildreth, 1983; Horn & Schunk, 1981; Ullman, 1979; Vidal & Hartley, 2008) , shape from shading (Horn & Brooks, 1989) , depth from binocular disparity (Marr, Palm, & Poggio, 1978; Marr & Poggio, 1979) , and shape from texture (Lobay & Forsyth, 2006; Witkin, 1981) .
It would not be a great exaggeration to say that early vision-part of visual processing that is prior to access to general knowledge-computes just about everything that might be called a 'visual appearance' of the world except the identities and names of the objects. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 51) On the other hand, despite impressive attempts (Biederman, 1987) , it is generally acknowledged that the processes proposed by natural computationalists cannot deliver representations rich enough to make full contact with semantic knowledge of the world. This is because object recognition-assigning visual information to semantic categories-requires identifying object parts and determining spatial relationships amongst these parts (Hoffman & Singh, 1997; Singh & Hoffman, 1997) . However, this in turn requires directing attention to specific entities in visual representations (i.e., individuating the critical parts) and using serial processes to determine spatial relations amongst the individuated entities (Pylyshyn, 1999 (Pylyshyn, , 200 1, 2003c (Pylyshyn, , 2007 Ullman, 1984) . The data-driven, parallel computations that characterize natural computation theories of vision are poor candidates for computing relationships between individuated objects or their parts. As a result, what early vision "does not do is identify the things we are looking at, in the sense of relating them to things we have seen before, the contents of our memory. And it does not make judgments about how things really are" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 51) .
Thus it appears that a pure, bottom-up natural computation theory of vision will not suffice. Similarly, it was argued earlier that a pure, top-down cognitive theory of vision is also insufficient. A complete theory of vision requires co-operative interactions between both data-driven and top-down processes. As philosopher Jerry Fodor (1985, p. 2) has noted, "perception is smart like cognition in that it is typically inferential, it is nevertheless dumb like reflexes in that it is typically encapsulated." This leads to what Pylyshyn calls the independence hypothesis: the proposal that some visual processing must be independent of cognition. However, because we are consciously aware of visual information, a corollary of the independence hypothesis is that there must be some interface between visual processing that is not cognitive and visual processing that is.
This interface is called visual cognition (Enns, 2004; Humphreys & Bruce, 1989; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Ullman, 2000) , because it involves visual attention (Wright, 1998) . Theories in visual cognition about both object identification (Treisman, 1988; Ullman, 2000) and the interpretation of motion (Wright & Dawson, 1994) typically describe three stages of processing: the precognitive delivery of visual information, the attentional analysis of this visual information, and the linking of the results of these analyses to general knowledge of the world.
One example theory in visual cognition is called feature integration theory (Treisman, 1986 (Treisman, , 1988 Treisman & Gelade, 1980) . Feature integration theory arose from two basic experimental findings. The first concerned search latency functions, which represent the time required to detect the presence or absence of a target as a function of the total number of display elements in a visual search task. Pioneering work on visual search discovered the so-called "pop-out effect": for some targets, the search latency function is essentially flat. This indicated that the time to find a target is independent of the number of distractor elements in the display. This result was found for targets defined by a unique visual feature (e.g., colour, contrast, orientation, movement), which seemed to pop out of a display, automatically drawing attention to the target (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) . In contrast, the time to detect a target defined by a unique combination of features generally increases with the number of distractor items, producing search latency functions with positive slopes.
The second experimental finding that led to feature integration theory was the discovery of illusory conjunctions (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) . Illusory conjunctions occur when features are mistakenly combined. For instance, subjects might be presented a red triangle and a green circle in a visual display but experience an illusory conjunction: a green triangle and a red circle.
Feature integration theory arose to explain different kinds of search latency functions and illusory conjunctions. It assumes that vision begins with a first, noncognitive stage of feature detection in which separate maps for a small number of basic features, such as colour, orientation, size, or movement, record the presence and location of detected properties. If a target is uniquely defined in terms of possessing one of these features, then it will be the only source of activity in that feature map and will therefore pop out, explaining some of the visual search results.
A second stage of processing belongs properly to visual cognition. In this stage, a spotlight of attention is volitionally directed to a particular spot on a master map of locations. This attentional spotlight enables the visual system to integrate features by bringing into register different feature maps at the location of interest. Different features present at that location can be conjoined together in a temporary object representation called an object file (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Treisman, Kahneman, & Burkell, 1983) . Thus in feature integration theory, searching for objects defined by unique combinations of features requires a serial scan of the attentional spotlight from location to location, explaining the nature of search latency functions for such objects. This stage of processing also explains illusory conjunctions, which usually occur when the attentional processing is divided, impairing the ability of correctly combining features into object files.
A third stage of processing belongs to higher-order cognition. It involves using information about detected objects (i.e., features united in object files) as links to general knowledge of the world.
Conscious perception depends on temporary object representations in which the different features are collected from the dimensional modules and inter-related, then matched to stored descriptions in a long-term visual memory to allow recognition. (Treisman, 1988, p. 204) Another proposal that relies on the notion of visual cognition concerns visual routines (Ullman, 1984) . Ullman (1984) noted that the perception of spatial relations is central to visual processing. However, many spatial relations cannot be directly delivered by the parallel, data-driven processes postulated by natural computationalists, because these relations are not defined over entire scenes, but are instead defined over particular entities in scenes (i.e., objects or their parts). Furthermore, many of these relations must be computed using serial processing of the sort that is not proposed to be part of the networks that propagate natural constraints.
For example, consider determining whether some point x is inside a contour y. Ullman (1984) pointed out that there is little known about how the relation inside (x, y) is actually computed, and argued that it most likely requires serial processing in which activation begins at x, spreading outward. It can be concluded that x is inside y if the spreading activation is contained by y. Furthermore, before inside (x, y) can be computed, the two entities, x and y, have to be individuated and selected-inside makes no sense to compute without their specification. "What the visual system needs is a way to refer to individual elements qua token individuals" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 207) .
With such considerations in mind, Ullman (1984) developed a theory of visual routines that shares many of the general features of feature integration theory. In an initial stage of processing, data-driven processes deliver early representations of the visual scene. In the second stage, visual cognition executes visual routines at specified locations in the representations delivered by the first stage of processing. Visual routines are built from a set of elemental operations and used to establish spatial relations and shape properties. Candidate elemental operations include indexing a salient item, spreading activation over a region, and tracing boundaries. A visual routine is thus a program, assembled out of elemental operations, which is activated when needed to compute a necessary spatial property. Visual routines are part of visual cognition because attention is used to select a necessary routine (and possibly create a new one), and to direct the routine to a specific location of interest. However, once the routine is activated, it can deliver its spatial judgment without requiring additional higher-order resources.
In the third stage, the spatial relations computed by visual cognition are linked, as in feature integration theory, to higher-order cognitive processes. Thus Ullman (1984) sees visual routines as providing an interface between the representations created by data-driven visual modules and the content-based, top-down processing of cognition. Such an interface permits data-driven and theory-driven processes to be combined, overcoming the limitations that such processes would face on their own.
Visual routines operate in the middle ground that, unlike the bottom-up creation of the base representations, is a part of the top-down processing and yet is independent of object-specific knowledge. Their study therefore has the advantage of going beyond the base representations while avoiding many of the additional complications associated with higher level components of the system. (Ullman, 1984, p. 119) The example theories of visual cognition presented above are hybrid theories in the sense that they include both bottom-up and top-down processes, and they invoke attentional mechanisms as a link between the two. In the next section we see that Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual indexing is similar in spirit to these theories and thus exhibits their hybrid characteristics. However, Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition is hybrid in another important sense: it makes contact with classical, connectionist, and embodied cognitive science.
Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition is classical because one of the main problems that it attempts to solve is how to identify or re-identify individuated entities. Classical processing is invoked as a result, because "individuating and reidentifying in general require the heavy machinery of concepts and descriptions" (Pylyshyn, 2007, p. 32) . Part of Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition is also connectionist, because he appeals to non-classical mechanisms to deliver visual representations (i.e., natural computation), as well as to connectionist networks (in particular, to winner-take-all mechanisms; see Feldman & Ballard, 1982) to track entities after they have been individuated with attentional tags (Pylyshyn, 2001 (Pylyshyn, , 2003c . Finally, parts of Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition draw on embodied cognitive science. For instance, the reason that tracking element identities-solving the correspondence problem-is critical is because Pylyshyn assumes a particular embodiment of the visual apparatus, a limited-order retina that cannot take in all information in a glance. Similarly, Pylyshyn uses the notion of cognitive scaffolding to account for the spatial properties of mental images.
Indexing Objects in the World
Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition began in the late 1970s with his interest in explaining how diagrams were used in reasoning (Pylyshyn, 2007) . Pylyshyn and his colleagues attempted to investigate this issue by building a computer simulation that would build and inspect diagrams as part of deriving proofs in plane geometry.
From the beginning, the plans for this computer simulation made contact with two of the key characteristics of embodied cognitive science. First, the diagrams created and used by the computer simulation were intended to be external to it and to scaffold the program's geometric reasoning.
Since we wanted the system to be as psychologically realistic as possible we did not want all aspects of the diagram to be 'in its head' but, as in real geometry problemsolving, remain on the diagram it was drawing and examining. (Pylyshyn, 2007, p. 10) Second, the visual system of the computer was also assumed to be psychologically realistic in terms of its embodiment. In particular, the visual system was presumed to be a moving fovea that was of limited order: it could only examine the diagram in parts, rather than all at once.
We also did not want to assume that all properties of the entire diagram were available at once, but rather that they had to be noticed over time as the diagram was being drawn and examined. If the diagram were being inspected by moving the eyes, then the properties should be within the scope of the moving fovea. (Pylyshyn, 2007, p. 10) These two intersections with embodied cognitive science-a scaffolding visual world and a limited order embodiment-immediately raised a fundamental information processing problem. As different lines or vertices were added to a diagram, or as these components were scanned by the visual system, their different identities had to be maintained or tracked over time. In order to function as intended, the program had to be able to assert, for example, that "this line observed here" is the same as "that line observed there" when the diagram is being scanned. In short, in considering how to create this particular system, Pylyshyn recognized that it required two core abilities: to be able to individuate visual entities, and to be able to track or maintain the identities of visual entities over time.
To maintain the identities of individuated elements over time is to solve the correspondence problem. How does one keep track of the identities of different entities perceived in different glances? According to Pylyshyn (2003b Pylyshyn ( , 2007 , the classical answer to this question must appeal to the contents of representations. To assert that some entity seen in a later glance was the same as one observed earlier, the descriptions of the current and earlier entities must be compared. If the descriptions matched, then the entities should be deemed to be the same. This is called the image matching solution to the correspondence problem, which also dictates how entities must be individuated: they must be uniquely described, when observed, as a set of properties that can be represented as a mental description, and which can be compared to other descriptions.
Pylyshyn rejects the classical image matching solution to the correspondence problem for several reasons. First, multiple objects can be tracked as they move to different locations, even if they are identical in appearance (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) . In fact, multiple objects can be tracked as their properties change, even when their location is constant and shared (Blaser, Pylyshyn, & Holcombe, 2000) . These results pose problems for image matching, because it is difficult to individuate and track identical objects by using their descriptions! Second, the poverty of the stimulus in a dynamic world poses severe challenges to image matching. As objects move in the world or as we (or our eyes) change position, a distal object's projection as a proximal stimulus will change properties, even though the object remains the same. "If objects can change their properties, we don't know under what description the object was last stored" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 205) .
A third reason to reject image matching comes from the study of apparent motion, which requires the correspondence problem to be solved before the illusion of movement between locations can be added (Dawson, 1991; Wright & Dawson, 1994) . Studies of apparent motion have shown that motion correspondence is mostly insensitive to manipulations of figural properties, such as shape, colour, or spatial frequency (Baro & Levinson, 1988; Cavanagh, Arguin, & von Grunau, 1989; Dawson, 1989; Goodman, 1978; Kolers, 1972; Kolers & Green, 1984; Kolers & Pomerantz, 1971; Kolers & von Grunau, 1976; Krumhansl, 1984; Navon, 1976; Victor & Conte, 1990) . This insensitivity to form led Nelson Goodman (1978, p. 78) to conclude that "plainly the visual system is persistent, inventive, and sometimes rather perverse in building a world according to its own lights." One reason for this perverseness may be that the neural circuits for processing motion are largely independent of those for processing form (Botez, 1975; Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) .
A fourth reason to reject image matching is that it is a purely cognitive approach to individuating and tracking entities. "Philosophers typically assume that in order to individuate something we must conceptualize its relevant properties. In other words, we must first represent (or cognize or conceptualize) the relevant conditions of individuation" (Pylyshyn, 2007, p. 31) . Pylyshyn rejected this approach because it suffers from the same core problem as the New Look: it lacks causal links to the world.
Pylyshyn's initial exploration of how diagrams aided reasoning led to his realization that the individuation and tracking of visual entities are central to an account of how vision links us to the world. For the reasons just presented, he rejected a purely classical approach-mental descriptions of entities-for providing these fundamental abilities. He proposed instead a theory that parallels the structure of the examples of visual cognition described earlier. That is, Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition includes a non-cognitive component (early vision), which delivers representations that can be accessed by visual attention (visual cognition), which in turn deliver representations that can be linked to general knowledge of the world (cognition).
On the one hand, the early vision component of Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition is compatible with natural computation accounts of perception (Ballard, 1997; Marr, 1982) . For Pylyshyn, the role of early vision is to provide causal links between the world and the perceiving agent without invoking cognition or inference:
Only a highly constrained set of properties can be selected by early vision, or can be directly 'picked up.' Roughly, these are what I have elsewhere referred to as 'transducable' properties. These are the properties whose detection does not require accessing memory and drawing inferences. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 163) The use of natural constraints to deliver representations such as the primal sketch and the 2½-D sketch is consistent with Pylyshyn's view.
On the other hand, Pylyshyn (2003b Pylyshyn ( , 2007 added innovations to traditional natural computation theories that have enormous implications for explanations of seeing and visualizing. First, Pylyshyn argued that one of the primitive processes of early vision is individuation-the picking out of an entity as being distinct from others. Second, he used evidence from feature integration theory and cognitive neuroscience to claim that individuation picks out objects, but not on the basis of their locations. That is, preattentive processes can detect elements or entities via primitive features but simultaneously not deliver the location of the features, as is the case in pop-out. Third, Pylyshyn argued that an individuated entity-a visual object-is preattentively tagged by an index, called a FINST ("for finger instantiation"), which can only be used to access an individuated object (e.g., to retrieve its properties when needed). Furthermore, only a limited number (four) of FINSTs are available. Fourth, once assigned to an object, a FINST remains attached to it even as the object changes its location or other properties. Thus a primitive component of early vision is the solution of the correspondence problem, where the role of this solution is to maintain the link between FINSTs and dynamic, individuated objects.
The revolutionary aspect of FINSTs is that they are presumed to individuate and track visual objects without delivering a description of them and without fixing their location. Pylyshyn (2007) argued that this is the visual equivalent of the use of indexicals or demonstratives in language: "Think of demonstratives in natural language-typically words like this or that. Such words allow us to refer to things without specifying what they are or what properties they have" (p. 18). FINSTs are visual indices that operate in exactly this way. They are analogous to placing a finger on an object in the world, and, while not looking, keeping the finger in contact with it as the object moved or changed-thus the term finger instantiation. As long as the finger is in place, the object can be referenced ("this thing that I am pointing to now"), even though the finger does not deliver any visual properties.
There is a growing literature that provides empirical support for Pylyshyn's FINST hypothesis. Many of these experiments involve the multiple object tracking paradigm (Flombaum, Scholl, & Pylyshyn, 2008; Franconeri et al., 2008; Pylyshyn, 2006; Pylyshyn & Annan, 2006; Pylyshyn et al., 2008; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Scholl, Pylyshyn, & Feldman, 2001; Sears & Pylyshyn, 2000) . In the original version of this paradigm (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) , subjects were shown a static display made up of a number of objects of identical appearance. A subset of these objects blinked for a short period of time, indicating that they were to-be-tracked targets. Then the blinking stopped, and all objects in the display began to move independently and randomly for a period of about ten seconds. Subjects had the task of tracking the targets, with attention only; a monitor ended trials in which eye movements were detected. At the end of a trial, one object blinked and subjects had to indicate whether or not it was a target.
The results of this study (see Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) indicated that subjects could simultaneously track up to four independently moving targets with high accuracy. Multiple object tracking results are explained by arguing that FINSTs are allocated to the flashing targets prior to movement, and objects are tracked by the primitive mechanism that maintains the link from visual object to FINST. This link permits subjects to judge targethood at the end of a trial.
The multiple object tracking paradigm has been used to explore some of the basic properties of the FINST mechanism. Analyses indicate that this process is parallel, because up to four objects can be tracked, and tracking results cannot be explained by a model that shifts a spotlight of attention serially from target to target (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) . However, the fact that no more than four targets can be tracked also shows that this processing has limited capacity. FINSTs are assigned to objects, and not locations; objects can be tracked through a location-less feature space (Blase, Pylyshyn, & Holcombe, 2000) . Using features to make the objects distinguishable from one another does not aid tracking, and object properties can actually change during tracking without subjects being aware of the changes (Bahrami, 2003; Pylyshyn, 2007) . Thus FINSTs individuate and track visual objects but do not deliver descriptions of the properties of the objects that they index.
Another source of empirical support for the FINST hypothesis comes from studies of subitizing (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1993 , 1994 . Subitizing is a phenomenon in which the number of items in a set of objects (the cardinality of the set) can be effortlessly and rapidly detected if the set has four or fewer items (Jensen, Reese, & Reese, 1950; Kaufman et al., 1949) . Larger sets cannot be subitized; a much slower process is required to serially count the elements of larger sets. Subitizing necessarily requires that the items to be counted are individuated from one another. Trick and Pylyshyn (1993, 1994) hypothesized that subitizing could be accomplished by the FINST mechanism; elements are preattentively individuated by being indexed, and counting simply requires accessing the number of indices that have been allocated. Trick and Pylyshyn (1993, 1994) tested this hypothesis by examining subitizing in conditions in which visual indexing was not possible. For instance, if the objects in a set are defined by conjunctions of features, then they cannot be preattentively FINSTed. Importantly, they also cannot be subitized. In general, subitizing does not occur when the elements of a set that are being counted are defined by properties that require serial, attentive processing in order to be detected (e.g., sets of concentric contours that have to be traced in order to be individuated; or sets of elements defined by being on the same contour, which also require tracing to be identified).
At the core of Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition is the claim that visual objects can be preattentively individuated and indexed. Empirical support for this account of early vision comes from studies of multiple object tracking and of subitizing. The need for such early visual processing comes from the goal of providing causal links between the world and classical representations, and from embodying vision in such a way that information can only be gleaned a glimpse at a time. Thus Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition, as described to this point, has characteristics of both classical and embodied cognitive science. How does the theory make contact with connectionist cognitive science? The answer to this question comes from examining Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 proposals concerning preattentive mechanisms for individuating visual objects and tracking them. The mechanisms that Pylyshyn proposed are artificial neural networks.
For instance, Pylyshyn (2000 Pylyshyn ( , 2003b noted that a particular type of artificial neural network, called a winner-take-all network (Feldman & Ballard, 1982) , is ideally suited for preattentive individuation. Many versions of such a network have been proposed to explain how attention can be automatically drawn to an object or to a distinctive feature (Fukushima, 1986; Gerrissen, 1991; Grossberg, 1980; Koch & Ullman, 1985; LaBerge Carter, & Brown, 1992; Sandon, 1992) . In a winner-take-all network, an array of processing units is assigned to different objects or to feature locations. For instance, these processors could be distributed across the preattentive feature maps in feature integration theory (Treisman, 1988; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) . Typically, a processor will have an excitatory connection to itself and will have inhibitory connections to its neighbouring processors. This pattern of connectivity results in the processor that receives the most distinctive input becoming activated and at the same time turning off its neighbours.
That such mechanisms might be involved in individuation is supported by results that show that the time course of visual search can be altered by visual manipulations that affect the inhibitory processing of such networks (Dawson & Thibodeau, 1998) . Pylyshyn endorses a modified winner-take-all network as a mechanism for individuation; the modification permits an object indexed by the network to be interrogated in order to retrieve its properties (Pylyshyn, 2000) .
Another intersection between Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition and connectionist cognitive science comes from his proposals about preattentive tracking. How can such tracking be accomplished without the use of image matching? Again, Pylyshyn noted that artificial neural networks, such as those that have been proposed for solving the motion correspondence problem (Dawson, 1991; Dawson, Nevin-Meadows, & Wright, 1994; Dawson & Pylyshyn, 1988; Dawson & Wright, 1994) , would serve as tracking mechanisms. This is because such models belong to the natural computation approach and have shown how tracking can proceed preattentively via the exploitation of natural constraints that are implemented as patterns of connectivity amongst processing units. Furthermore, Dawson (1991) has argued that many of the regularities that govern solutions to the motion correspondence problem are consistent with the hypothesis that solving this problem is equivalent to tracking assigned visual tags. For example, consider some observations concerning the location of motion correspondence processing and attentional tracking processes in the brain. Dawson argued that motion correspondence processing is most likely performed by neurons located in Area 7 of the parietal cortex, on the basis of motion signals transmitted from earlier areas, such as the motion-sensitive area MT. Area 7 of the parietal cortex is also a good candidate for the locus of tracking of individuated entities.
First, many researchers have observed cells that appear to mediate object tracking in Area 7, such as visual fixation neurons and visual tracking neurons. Such cells are not evident earlier in the visual pathway (Goldberg & Bruce, 1985; Hyvarinen & Poranen, 1974; Lynch et al., 1977; Motter & Mountcastle, 1981; Robinson, Goldberg, & Stanton, 1978; Sakata et al., 1985) .
Second, cells in this area are also governed by extraretinal (i.e., attentional) influences-they respond to attended targets, but not to unattended targets, even when both are equally visible (Robinson, Goldberg, & Stanton, 1978) . This is required of mechanisms that can pick out and track targets from identically shaped distractors, as in a multiple object tracking task.
Third, Area 7 cells that appear to be involved in tracking appear to be able to do so across sensory modalities. For instance, hand projection neurons respond to targets to which hand movements are to be directed and do not respond when either the reach or the target are present alone (Robinson Goldberg, & Stanton, 1978) . Similarly, there exist many Area Y cells that respond during manual reaching, tracking, or manipulation, and which also have a preferred direction of reaching (Hyvarinen & Poranen, 1974) . Such cross-modal coordination of tracking is critical, because as we see in the next section, Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition assumes that indices can be applied, and tracked, in different sensory modalities, permitting seeing agents to point at objects that have been visually individuated.
The key innovation and contribution of Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition is the proposal of preattentive individuation and tracking. This proposal can be seamlessly interfaced with related proposals concerning visual cognition. For instance, once objects have been tagged by FINSTs, they can be operated on by visual routines (Ullman, 1984 (Ullman, , 2000 . Pylyshyn (2003b) pointed out that in order to execute, visual routines require such individuation:
The visual system must have some mechanism for picking out and referring to particular elements in a display in order to decide whether two or more such elements form a pattern, such as being collinear, or being inside, on, or part of another element, so on. Pylyshyn (2003b, pp. 206-207) In other words, visual cognition can direct attentional resources to FINSTed entities. Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition also makes contact with classical cognition. He noted that once objects have been tagged, the visual system can examine their spatial properties by applying visual routines or using focal attention to retrieve visual features. The point of such activities by visual cognition would be to update descriptions of objects stored as object files (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992) . The object file descriptions can then be used to make contact with the semantic categories of classical cognition. Thus the theory of visual indexing provides a causal grounding of visual concepts:
Indexes may serve as the basis for real individuation of physical objects. While it is clear that you cannot individuate objects in the full-blooded sense without a conceptual apparatus, it is also clear that you cannot individuate them with only a conceptual apparatus. Sooner or later concepts must be grounded in a primitive causal connection between thoughts and things. (Pylyshyn, 2001, p. 154) It is the need for such grounding that has led Pylyshyn to propose a theory of visual cognition that includes characteristics of classical, connectionist, and embodied cognitive science.
Situation, Vision, and Action
Why is Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 proposal of preattentive visual indices important? It has been noted that one of the key problems facing classical cognitive science is that it needs some mechanism for referring to the world that is preconceptual, and that the impact of Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition is that it provides an account of exactly such a mechanism (Fodor, 2009) . How this is accomplished is sketched out in Figure 8 -8, which provides a schematic of the various stages in Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition. The initial stages of the theory posit causal links from distal objects arrayed in space in a three-dimensional world and mental representations that are produced from these links. The laws of optics and projective geometry begin by creating a proximal stimulus-a pattern of stimulation on the retina-that is uniquely determined, but because of the problem of underdetermination cannot be uniquely inverted. The problem of underdetermination is initially dealt with by a variety of visual modules that compose early vision, and which use natural constraints to deliver unique and useful representations of the world (e.g., the primal sketch and the 2½-D sketch). Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition elaborates Marr's (1982) natural computation view of vision. In addition to using Marr's representations, Pylyshyn claims that early vision can individuate visual objects by assigning them one of a limited number of tags (FINSTs). Furthermore, preattentive processes permit these tags to remain attached, even if the properties of the tagged objects change. This result of early vision is illustrated in Figure 8-8 as the sequences of solid arrows that link each visual object to its own internal FINST.
Once objects have been individuated by the assignment of visual indices, the operations of visual cognition can be applied (Treisman, 1986 (Treisman, , 1988 Ullman, 1984 Ullman, , 2000 . Attention can be directed to individuated elements, permitting visual properties to be detected or spatial relations amongst individuated objects to be computed. The result is that visual cognition can be used to create a description of an individuated object in its object file (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992) . As shown in Figure 8 -8, visual cognition has created an internal object file for each of the three distal objects involved in the diagram.
Once object files have been created, general knowledge of the world-isotropic cognitive processes (Fodor, 1983) can be exploited. Object files can be used to access classical representations of the world, permitting semantic categories to be applied to the visual scene.
However, object files permit another important function in Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition because of the preattentive nature of the processes that created them: a referential link from an object file to a distal object in the world. This is possible because the object files are associated with FINSTs, and the FINSTs themselves were the end product of a causal, non-cognitive chain of events:
An index corresponds to two sorts of links or relations: on the one hand, it corresponds to a causal chain that goes from visual objects to certain tokens in the representation of the scene being built (perhaps an object file), and on the other hand, it is also a referential relationship that enables the visual system to refer to those particular [visual objects]. The second of these functions is possible because the first one exists and has the right properties. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 269) The referential links back to the distal world are illustrated as the dashed lines in Figure 8 -8.
The availability of the referential links provides Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition (2003b, 2007) with distinct advantages over a purely classical model. Recall that a top-down model operates by creating and maintaining internal descriptions of distal objects. It was earlier noted that one problem with this approach is that the projected information from an object is constantly changing, in spite of the fact that the object's identity is constant. This poses challenges for solving the correspondence problem by matching descriptions. However, this also leads a classical model directly into what is known as the frame problem (Ford & Pylyshyn, 1996; Pylyshyn, 1987) . The frame problem faces any system that has to update classical descriptions of a changing world. This is because as a property changes, a classical system must engage in a series of deductions to determine the implications of the change. The number of possible deductions is astronomical, resulting in the computational intractability of a purely descriptive system.
The referential links provide a solution to the frame problem. This is because the tracking of a FINSTed object and the perseverance of the object file for that object occur without the need of constantly updating the object's description. The link between the FINST and the world is established via the causal link from the world through the proximal stimulus to the operation of early vision. The existence of the referential link permits the contents of the object file to be refreshed or updated-not constantly, but only when needed. "One of the purposes of a tag was to allow the visual system to revisit the tagged object to encode some new property" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 208) .
The notion of revisiting an indexed object in order to update the contents of an object file when needed, combined with the assumption that visual processing is embodied in such a way to be of limited order, link Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition to a different theory that is central to embodied cognitive science, enactive perception (Noë, 2004) . Enactive perception realizes that the detailed phenomenal experience of vision is an illusion because only a small amount of visual information is ever available to us (Noë, 2002) . Enactive perception instead views perception as a sensorimotor skill that can access information in the world when it is needed. Rather than building detailed internal models of the world, enactive perception views the world as its own representation (Noë, 2009); we don't encode an internal model of the world, we inspect the outer world when required or desired. This account of enactive perception mirrors the role of referential links to the distal world in Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition.
Of course, enactive perception assumes much more than information in the world is accessed, and not encoded. It also assumes that the goal of perception is to guide bodily actions upon the world. "Perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do" (Noë, 2004, p. 1) . This view of perception arises because enactive perception is largely inspired by Gibson's (1966 Gibson's ( , 1979 ) ecological approach to perception. Actions on the world were central to Gibson. He proposed that perceiving agents "picked up" the affordances of objects in the world, where an affordance is a possible action that an agent could perform on or with an object.
Actions on the world (ANCHORs) provide a further link between Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition and enactive perception, and consequently with embodied cognitive science. Pylyshyn's theory also accounts for such actions, because FINSTs are presumed to exist in different sensory modalities. In particular, ANCHORs are analogous to FINSTs and serve as indices to places in motor-command space, or in proprioceptive space (Pylyshyn, 1989) . The role of ANCHORs is to serve as indices to which motor movements can be directed. For instance, in the 1989 version of his theory, Pylyshyn hypothesized that ANCHORs could be used to direct the gaze (by moving the fovea to the ANCHOR) or to direct a pointer.
The need for multimodal indexing is obvious because we can easily point at what we are looking at. Conversely, if we are not looking at something, it cannot be indexed, and therefore cannot be pointed to as accurately. For instance, when subjects view an array of target objects in a room, close their eyes, and then imagine viewing the objects from a novel vantage point (a rotation from their original position), their accuracy in pointing to the targets decreases (Rieser, 1989) . Similarly, there are substantial differences between reaches towards visible objects and reaches towards objects that are no longer visible but are only present through imagery or memory (Goodale, Jakobson, & Keillor, 1994) . Likewise, when subjects reach towards an object while avoiding obstacles, visual feedback is exploited to optimize performance; when visual feedback is not available, the reaching behaviour changes dramatically (Chapman & Goodale, 2010) .
In Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition, coordination between vision and action occurs via interactions between visual and motor indices, which generate mappings between the spaces of the different kinds of indices. Requiring transformations between spatial systems makes the location of indexing and tracking mechanisms in parietal cortex perfectly sensible. This is because there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that parietal cortex instantiates a variety of spatial mappings, and that one of its key roles is to compute transformations between different spatial representations (Andersen et al., 1997; Colby & Goldberg, 1999; Merriam, Genovese, & Colby, 2003; Merriam & Colby, 2005) . One such transformation could produce coordination between visual FINSTs and motor ANCHORs.
One reason that Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition is also concerned with visually guided action is his awareness of Goodale's work on visuomotor modules (Goodale, 1988 (Goodale, , 1990 (Goodale, , 1995 Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; Goodale et al., 1991) , work that was introduced earlier in relation to embodied cognitive science.
The evidence supporting Goodale's notion of visuomotor modules clearly indicates that some of the visual information used to control actions is not available to isotropic cognitive processes, because it can affect actions without requiring or producing conscious awareness. It seems very natural, then, to include motor indices (i.e., ANCHORs) in a theory in which such tags are assigned and maintained preattentively.
The discussion in this section would seem to place Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition squarely in the camp of embodied cognitive science. Referential links between object files and distal objects permit visual information to be accessible without requiring the constant updating of descriptive representations. The postulation of indices that can guide actions and movements and the ability to coordinate these indices with visual tags place a strong emphasis on action in Pylyshyn's approach.
However, Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition has many properties that make it impossible to pigeonhole as an embodied position. In particular, a key difference between Pylyshyn's theory and enactive perception is that Pylyshyn does not believe that the sole goal of vision is to guide action. Vision is also concerned with descriptions and concepts-the classical cognition of represented categories:
Preparing for action is not the only purpose of vision. Vision is, above all, a way to find out about the world, and there may be many reasons why an intelligent organism may wish to know about the world, apart from wanting to act upon it. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 133) 
Scaffolding the Mental Image
In Chapter 3 we introduced the imagery debate, which concerns two different accounts of the architectural properties of mental images. One account, known as the depictive theory (Kosslyn, 1980 (Kosslyn, , 1994 Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006) , argues that we experience the visual properties of mental images because the format of these images is quasi-pictorial, and that they literally depict visual information.
The other account, propositional theory, proposes that images are not depictive, but instead describe visual properties using a logical or propositional representation (Pylyshyn, 1973 (Pylyshyn, , 1979b (Pylyshyn, , 1981a (Pylyshyn, , 2003b . It argues that the privileged properties of mental images proposed by Kosslyn and his colleagues are actually the result of the intentional fallacy: the spatial properties that Kosslyn assigns to the format of images should more properly be assigned to their contents.
The primary support for the depictive theory has come from relative complexity evidence collected from experiments on image scanning (Kosslyn, 1980) and mental rotation (Shepard & Cooper, 1982) . This evidence generally shows a linear relationship between the time required to complete a task and a spatial property of an image transformation. For instance, as the distance between two locations on an image increases, so too does the time required to scan attention from one location to the other. Similarly, as the amount of rotation that must be applied to an image increases, so too does the time required to judge that the image is the same or different from another. Proponents of propositional theory have criticized these results by demonstrating that they are cognitively penetrable (Pylyshyn, 2003c): a change in tacit information eliminates the linear relationship between time and image transformation, which would not be possible if the depictive properties of mental images were primitive.
If a process such as image scanning is cognitively penetrable, then this means that subjects have the choice not to take the time to scan attention across the image. But this raises a further question: "Why should people persist on using this method when scanning entirely in their imagination where the laws of physics and the principles of spatial scanning do not apply (since there is no real space)?" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 309 ). Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition provides a possible answer to this question that is intriguing, because it appeals to a key proposal of the embodied approach: cognitive scaffolding.
Pylyshyn's scaffolding approach to mental imagery was inspired by a general research paradigm that investigated whether visual processing and mental imagery shared mechanisms. In such studies, subjects superimpose a mental image over other information that is presented visually, in order to see whether the different sources of information can interact, for instance by producing a visual illusion (Bernbaum & Chung, 1981; Finke & Schmidt, 1977; Goryo, Robinson, & Wilson, 1984; Ohkuma, 1986) . This inspired what Pylyshyn (2007) called the index projection hypothesis. This hypothesis brings Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition into contact with embodied cognitive science, because it invokes cognitive scaffolding via the visual world.
According to the index projection hypothesis, mental images are scaffolded by visual indices that are assigned to real world (i.e., to visually present) entities. For instance, consider Pylyshyn's (2003b) application of the index projection hypothesis to the mental map paradigm used to study image scanning:
If, for example, you imagine the map used to study mental scanning superimposed over one of the walls in the room you are in, you can use the visual features of the wall to anchor various objects in the imagined map. In this case, the increase in time it takes to access information from loci that are further apart is easily explained since the 'images,' or, more neutrally, 'thoughts' of these objects are actually located further apart. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 376, p. 374) In other words, the spatial properties revealed in mental scanning studies are not due to mental images per se, but instead arise from "the real spatial nature of the sensory world onto which they are 'projected'" (p. 374).
If the index projection hypothesis is valid, then how does it account for mental scanning results when no external world is visible? Pylyshyn argued that in such conditions, the linear relationship between distance on an image and the time to scan it may not exist. For instance, evidence indicates that when no external information is visible, smooth attentional scanning may not be possible (Pylyshyn & Cohen, 1999) .
As well, the exploration of mental images is accompanied by eye movements similar to those that occur when a real scene is explored (Brandt & Stark, 1997) . Pylyshyn (2007) pointed out that this result is exactly what would be predicted by the index projection hypothesis, because the eye movements would be directed to real world entities that have been assigned visual indices.
The cognitive scaffolding of mental images may not merely concern their manipulation, but might also be involved when images are created. There is a long history of the use of mental images in the art of memory (Yates, 1966) . One important technique is the ancient method of loci, in which mental imagery is used to remember a sequence of ideas (e.g., ideas to be presented in a speech).
The memory portion of the Rhetorica ad Herrenium, an anonymous text that originated in Rome circa 86 BC and reached Europe by the Middle Ages, teaches the method of loci as follows. A well-known building is used as a "wax tablet" onto which memories are to be "written." As one mentally moves, in order, through the rooms of the building, one places an image representing some idea or content in each locus-that is, in each imagined room. During recall, one mentally walks through the building again, and "sees" the image stored in each room. "The result will be that, reminded by the images, we can repeat orally what we have committed to the loci, proceeding in either direction from any locus we please" (Yates, 1966, p. 7) .
In order for the method of loci to be effective, a great deal of effort must be used to initially create the loci to be used to store memories (Yates, 1966) . Ancient rules of memory taught students the most effective way to do this. According to the Rhetorica ad Herrenium, each fifth locus should be given a distinguishing mark. A locus should not be too similar to the others, in order to avoid confusion via resemblance. Each locus should be of moderate size and should not be brightly lit, and the intervals between loci should also be moderate (about thirty feet). Yates (1966, p. 8) was struck by "the astonishing visual precision which [the classical rules of memory] imply. In a classically trained memory the space between the loci can be measured, the lighting of the loci is allowed for."
How was such a detailed set of memory loci to be remembered? The student of memory was taught to use what we would now call cognitive scaffolding. They should lay down a set of loci by going to an actual building, and by literally moving through it from locus to locus, carefully committing each place to memory as they worked (Yates, 1966) . Students were advised to visit secluded buildings in order to avoid having their memorization distracted by passing crowds. The Phoenix, a memory manual published by Peter of Ravenna in 1491, recommended visiting unfrequented churches for this reason. These classical rules for the art of memory "summon up a vision of a forgotten social habit. Who is that man moving slowly in the lonely building, stopping at intervals with an intent face? He is a rhetoric student forming a set of memory loci" (Yates, 1966, p. 8) .
According to the index projection hypothesis, "by anchoring a small number of imagined objects to real objects in the world, the imaginal world inherits much of the geometry of the real world" (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 378) . The classical art of memory, the method of loci, invokes a similar notion of scaffolding, attempting not only to inherit the real world's geometry, but to also inherit its permanence.
The Bounds of Cognition
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition. This theory is of interest because different aspects of it make contact with classical, connectionist, or embodied cognitive science.
The classical nature of Pylyshyn's theory is found in his insistence that part of the purpose of vision is to make contact with perceptual categories that can be involved in general cognitive processing (e.g., inference and problem solving). The connectionist nature of Pylyshyn's theory is found in his invocation of artificial neural networks as the mechanisms for assigning and tracking indices as part of early vision. The embodied nature of Pylyshyn's theory is found in referential links between object files and distal objects, the use of indices to coordinate vision and action, and the use of indices and of referential links to exploit the external world as a scaffold for seeing and visualizing.
However, the hybrid nature of Pylyshyn's theory of visual cognition presents us with a different kind of puzzle. How is this to be reconciled with Pylyshyn's position as a champion of classical cognitive science and as a critic of connectionist (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) and embodied (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981) traditions? The answer to this question is that when Pylyshyn writes of cognition, this term has a very technical meaning that places it firmly in the realm of classical cognitive science, and which-by this definition-separates it from both connectionist and embodied cognitive science.
Recall that Pylyshyn's (2003b Pylyshyn's ( , 2007 theory of visual cognition was motivated in part by dealing with some of the problems facing purely cognitive theories of perception such as the New Look. His solution was to separate early vision from cognition and to endorse perceptual mechanisms that solve problems of underdetermination without requiring inferential processing.
I propose a distinction between vision and cognition in order to try to carve nature at her joints, that is, to locate components of the mind/brain that have some principled boundaries or some principled constraints in their interactions with the rest of the mind. (Pylyshyn, 2003b, p. 39) The key to the particular "carving" of the system in his theory is that early vision, which includes preattentive mechanisms for individuating and tracking objects, does not do so by using concepts, categories, descriptions, or inferences. Time and again in his accounts of seeing and visualizing, Pylyshyn describes early vision as being "preconceptual" or "non-conceptual." This is important because of Pylyshyn's (1984) characterization of the levels of analysis of cognitive science. Some of the levels of analysis that he invoked-in particular, the implementational and algorithmic levels-are identical to those levels as discussed in Chapter 2 in this volume. However, Pylyshyn's version of the computational level of analysis is more restrictive than the version that was also discussed in that earlier chapter.
For Pylyshyn (1984) , a computational-level analysis requires a cognitive vocabulary. A cognitive vocabulary captures generalizations by appealing to the contents of representations, and it also appeals to lawful principles governing these contents (e.g., rules of inference, the principle of rationality). "The cognitive vocabulary is roughly similar to the one used by what is undoubtedly the most successful predictive scheme available for human behavior-folk psychology" (p. 2).
When Pylyshyn (2003b Pylyshyn ( , 2007 separates early vision from cognition, he is proposing that the cognitive vocabulary cannot be productively used to explain early vision, because early vision is not cognitive, it is preconceptual. Thus it is no accident that when his theory of visual cognition intersects connectionist and embodied cognitive science, it does so with components that are part of Pylyshyn's account of early vision. Connectionism and embodiment are appropriate in this component of Pylyshyn's theory because his criticism of these approaches is that they are not cognitive, because they do not or cannot use a cognitive vocabulary!
